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1. Introduction: The Problems of Kant and the "Old Metaphysics" 
Kant's "transcendental" or "critical" philosophy is an instance of what 
can be called the "critique of immediacy." 1 As part of his critical project, 
Kant argues that one cannot merely assume that there is a preestablished 
harmony between thought and being. Instead, one must effect a "return to 
the subject" and examine the forms of thought themselves, in order to de-
termine the extent to which thought and being are commensurable. As a 
result of his "transcendental turn," Kant concludes that what at first ap-
pears as immediately given to thought is always already (at least partly) the 
result of some kind of activity or mediation on the part of thought itself. 
Hegel approves of Kant's critical orientation: Kant correctly demanded 
to know "how far the forms of thought were capable of leading to the knowl-
edge of truth," and correctly concluded that "the forms of thought must be 
made into an object of investigation.,,2 However, for Hegel, the problem 
with Kant was that he aimed to examine the forms of thought as if they were 
necessarily separated from being itself. Thus the Kantian strategy, for Hegel, 
led to a twofold absurdity. 
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First of all, Kant was led to the untenable position that one could 
come to know the forms of thought before actually engaging in knowing. 
Thus Kant" ... demanded a criticism of the faculty of cognition as prelimi-
nary to its exercise.,,3 The absurdity of this demand is obvious: 
the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowl-
edge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. 
But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of 
Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.4 
The second untenable implication bound up with Kant's critique of 
immediacy has to do with the alleged unknowability of the things-in-
themselves. Because Kant at first conceived of the knowing subject as 
essentially separate from being itself, he was unable to reestablish a genuine 
cognitive relation between thought and being. Thus for Kant, all thought 
and reflection are and must remain purely subjective activities: "Thoughts, 
according to Kant, although universal and necessary categories, are only our 
thoughts-separated by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart 
from our knowledge.,,5 The Kantian dichotomy between what is "for cogni-
tion" and what is "in itself' amounts to the contradictory idea that cognition 
is simultaneously both "outside of the truth," yet "nevertheless true" as well.6 
For Hegel, the two absurdities that characterize the Kantian position 
are related. After all, if the instrument of our knowing prevents us from 
knowing being in itself, then presumably we would be unable to know the 
being of the instrument of our knowing as well. In order to avoid the con-
tradiction here, Kant must hold, at least implicitly, that one can come to 
know at least something (namely, the being of the instrument of our know-
ing) apart from, or prior to, the distorting effects of the instrument itself. 
But if this is the case, then the alleged instrument of our knowing is not the 
instrument of all our knowing, but only the instrument of some types of 
knowing; but if this is so, then the Kantian dichotomy between thinking 
and being ultimately breaks down. 7 
Because of the difficulties in Kant, Hegel argues that there must be 
some kind of "return "-although not an uncritical return-to "the old meta-
physics," a term which Hegel uses to refer to the metaphysics which preceded 
Kant's "critical philosophy."8 Contrary to Kant, the old metaphysicians 
were correct in affirming the fundamental commensurability of thought 
and being: 
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This metaphysical system took the laws and forms of thought to be the 
fundamental laws and forms of things. It assumed that to think a thing 
was the means of finding its very self and nature: and to that extent it 
occupied higher ground than the Critical Philosophy which succeeded it.9 
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The old metaphysicians, however, were also guilty of a twofold failing. 
First of all, because of their unquestioning and immediate affirmation of 
the commensurability of thought and being, the old metaphysicians could 
not adequately address the critical concerns which were eventually raised by 
thinkers like Hume and Kant. Thus the "critical turn" in philosophy was 
both justified and necessary: 
A very important step was undoubtedly made, when the terms of the old 
metaphysic were subjected to scrutiny. The plain thinker pursued his un-
suspecting way in those categories which had offered themselves naturally. 
It never occurred to him to ask to what extent these categories had a value 
and authority of their own. If, as has been said, it is characteristic of free 
thought to allow no assumptions to pass unquestioned, the old metaphysi-
cians were not free thinkers. 10 
The second, and related, failing of the old metaphysicians had to do 
with their problematic conception of the relationship between appearance 
and essence, between the being of things and their truth. On one level, the 
pre-Kantian metaphysicians did realize that the immediate appearances of 
things could not be identified with the truth of things. But in addressing 
the question of truth, the old metaphysicians tended to characterize the 
relationship between appearance and truth as a relationship between one 
"given" objective determination-one kind of being-and another: 
... man is not content with a bare acquaintance, or with the fact as it 
appears to the senses; he would like to get behind the surface, to know 
what it is, and to comprehend it. This leads him to reflect: he seeks to find 
out the cause as something distinct from the mere phenomenon: he tries 
to know the inside in its distinction from the outside. Hence the phenom-
enon becomes double, it splits into inside and outside, into force and 
manifestation, into cause and effect.ll 
Because of their uncritical reliance on things as given, the old meta-
physicians regarded objects as somehow "ready-made" for thought. 12 
Accordingly, the old metaphysicians characterized the truth, or essence, of 
things as something already "out there," but only lying behind, or inside, 
the things themselves. As a result of their precritical conception of truth, 
the old metaphysicians portrayed the relationship between essence and 
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appearance (and thus between thought and being) as one of indifference. It 
is precisely because of this alleged indifference that Hume and Kant could 
justifiably raise the critical question: if essence and appearance, thought 
and being, are indifferently related, then how can we. know for sure that the 
essences which we know in thought are actually commensurable with what 
appears in the realm of being as it is "ready-made," outside of us? 
Against both the old metaphysicians and Kant, Hegel wants to dem-
onstrate that "essence must appear,,,n or-more fully-that "essence must 
appear and only ever does appear." Hegel's demonstration of this will con-
sist in his articulation of the fundamental identity-in-difference of" Schein" 
(or "Illusory Being,,)14 and Essence. Hegel's affirmation of this identity-in-
difference entails the following two claims: 
(1) First, the Schein or "mere appearance" that emerges from the sphere 
of Being-in accordance with its very own nature-only seems to be "mere" 
Schein, but is in fact always the Schein of what is essential, the Schein of 
Essence itself. The seeming or showing of Illusory Being is the showing 
forth of Essence itself. 
(2) Secondly, Essence, for its own part, only ever appears or seems. 
Essence, in order to be Essence at all, must seem and only ever does seem in 
the form of Illusory Being. There is nothing "behind" or "beyond" the seem-
ing of Being, since the seeming of Being is simply Essence in its immediacy. 
Stated differently, there is no "unseemly" being-in-itselfleft that lies hidden 
behind the seeming of Being. 
Hegel's two fundamental claims can be encapsulated in one sentence: 
there is no Schein without Essence and no Essence without Schein, because 
the two are identical in their difference. Hegel's demonstration of this will 
amount to a simultaneous overcoming of the reciprocal shortcomings of 
Kant and the old metaphysics. Unlike Kant, Hegel does not begin with the 
separation of being and thought. Thus unlike Kant, he does not need to 
argue that there is a privileged kind of self-knowledge that allegedly "pre-
cedes" other acts of knowing. And unlike the old metaphysicians, Hegel is 
not committed to an uncritical acceptance of immediacy, or being as given. 
While Hegel does, indeed, begin with being in its immediacy, he effects a _ 
critique of immediacy (yet without buying into the Kantian subject-object 
dichotomy) insofar as he shows that being as immediate is inadequate on its 
own terms. Stated differently, Hegel shows how being, as immediate, cri-
tiques itself. The net result is that Hegel combines a critique of immediacy 
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with a critique of the problematic subject-object dichotomy that had charac-
terized Kant's critique of immediacy. 
Hegel's demonstration that "essence must appear" is to be found in 
the transition from Being to Essence in the "Objective Logic" of his Science 
of Logic. Thus Hegel can write that "The objective logic ... takes the place 
rather of former metaphysics which was intended to be the scientific con-
struction of the world in terms of thoughts alone." 15 Within the limited 
scope of this essay, it will not be possible to provide a full account of the 
categories that constitute the Objective Logic. But it will be possible to offer 
a discussion of the crucial transition from Being to Essence. If one can show 
why, for Hegel, "essence must appear," then eo ipso one will have demonstrated 
the basic outlines of Hegel's simultaneous sublation of Kant and the old 
metaphysics. The present account of the transition from Being to Essence 
will begin with a brief discussion of the inadequacy of Being as such. 
2. The Inadequacy of Being 
The transition from Being to Essence implicates one of the perennial 
problems of philosophy: 
The problem or aim of philosophy is often represented as the ascertain-
ment of the essence of things: a phrase which only means that things, 
instead of being left in their immediacy, must be shown to be mediated by, 
or based upon something else. The immediate Being of things is thus con-
ceived under the image of a rind or curtain behind which the Essence 
lies hidden. 16 
In his Phenomenology of Spirit, at the conclusion of the section en-
titled "Consciousness," Hegel had already shown that the truth of beings 
cannot. reside simply in some further, hidden kind of "being" which lies 
behind the beings which appear to consciousness. 17 Now, in his Logic, Hegel 
seeks to show that the truth of Being cannot be found within the sphere of 
Being itself, but in the sphere of Essence; however, the realm of Essence is 
not simply external to that of Being. Instead, the logical movement from 
Being to Essence must equally be "the movement of Being itself.',18 Now, 
since the transition from Being to Essence cannot be imposed from with-
out, the transition must be motivated by an internal lack or inadequacy 
which belongs to Being itself. This internal failing becomes manifest when 
Being itself reveals itself as "in and for itself a nullity." 19 
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But how can Being turn out to be a nullity? The inadequacy of Being 
will reveal itself as the same basic inadequacy that infects all less-than-
complete mediations of what is at first simply given as immediate. The term 
"immediacy" (like potentiality in Aristotle's sense) is a relative term. What 
is on one level mediated may be on another level merely immediate; or, 
expressed in epistemological categories, what is understood or explained on 
one level may become on another level mere data for further explanation. 
The Doctrine of Being in Hegel's Science of Logic is nothing other than the 
story of such relative mediations. As relative mediations, however, they re-
main always mediations of one thing in relation to another, that is, one 
thing in relation to what the thing is not. As we learn in the Logic, the 
sphere of Being is constituted by a series of relative mediations that cannot 
ultimately be contained or explained in terms of Being itself. 
Within the sphere of Being, the only absolute immediacy is "Pure Be-
ing," from which the Science of Logic makes its beginning. However, this 
first and most pure immediacy is unstable on its own terms, because Pure 
Being-precisely because of its immediacy-is indistinguishable from Pure 
Nothing. The instability and inadequacy of Pure Being, considered on its 
own, is made explicit through the recognition of its equivalence with 
Nothing, an equivalence which requires further explication in the category 
of Becoming. Every other category within the sphere of Being will repre-
sent one or another type of relative mediation under the general rubric 
of Becoming. 
The category of Becoming reaches further articulation as the category 
of Determinateness per se [die Bestimmtheit als solchel.20 Since such Deter-
minateness is presented in its immediate unity (i.e. Becoming as the 
immediate unity of Being and Nothing), and since simple unity always bears 
the form of Being, this Determinateness must be articulated as the category 
of Determinate Being [Daseinl, or Quality (as opposed to Determinate Noth-
ing). The category of Quality soon demonstrates its own inadequacy in the 
infinite progression of "qualitied" Somethings and Others. This bad infi-
nite of endless qualitative variability is remedied temporarily by the genesis 
of Being-for-self, a more highly mediated form of self-relation, in which the 
equivalence of affirmation and negation (the original equivalence of Being 
and Nothing) is apparently restored. The desired stability seems to reach its 
consummation in the substrate of Quantity, whose featureless unit is indif-
ferent to an infinitely variable qualitative content. However, this category 
also reveals its own inadequacy when the limits which are meant to distin-
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guish one quality-less unit (Quantum) from another are shown to be fluid 
and arbitrary. With this, the sphere of Being once again finds itself in the 
throes of a bad infinite regress.21 
The relativity endemic to this quantitative bad infinite seems to be 
overcome with the genesis of Measure, a category which "attempts" to incor-
porate into itself the previous categories of both Quality and Quantity. This 
synthesis, however, generates the Nodal Line of Measure Relations, which 
involves thought in an endless alteration between qualitative and quantita-
tive phases of change. In the Nodal Line, when Quantities alter beyond 
a certain limit, each Measure-relationship (upon which a corresponding 
Quality is based) becomes what appears to be absolute Measurelessness. 
But any Measurelessness merely provides the grounds for the generation of 
a new set of Measure-relations. This new set persists until its Quantities 
once again change beyond a certain point to produce yet another apparent 
Measurelessness. The process repeats itself indefinitely, and so Measure, 
too, has developed a bad infinite oscillation, only this time between Mea-
sure and the Measureless. 22 
At this stage, the sphere of Being has exhausted all of its resources in 
its search for internal normativity. In its attempted flight from the relativity 
of its own mediations, it has merely achieved within itself progressively higher, 
though always short-lived, stages of mediation. The inadequacy of all the 
categories within the sphere of Being becomes explicit when Being turns 
upon itself, attempting to flee relativism by resorting to its original catego-
ries and introducing new permutations and combinations. But even the 
final set of permutations and combinations (namely the category of Mea-
sure, which combines the previous categories of Quality and Quantity) can 
result only in new kind of infinite regress. It is quite true that, in order to 
transcend its own relativisms, the sphere of Being must turn back upon 
itself. But this turning back can offer a way out of relativism only if it suc-
ceeds in propelling the sphere of Being beyond itself. In other words, the 
final bad infinite in the Doctrine of Being is not to be overcome by any 
recourse to Quality or Quantity, or to any combination of these categories. 
But it is not clear yet just how this overcoming is to be achieved. 
The necessity of Being's own failing can be expressed if we recall the 
mandate with which the Science of Logic began: to comprehend what it 
means just to be, simply, stably, and apart from all distinctions, mediations, 
and qualifications. As we saw, "to be" means "to be determinate," and "to 
be determinate means "to be in relation. ,,23 Thus even Being as immediate 
146 The Owl of Mine tva 29:2 (Spring 1998) 
cannot "just" be; and so the entire sphere of Being has implicitly contra-
dicted itself. Hegel's task in what follows will not be to avoid the contradiction, 
but rather to comprehend it, and this will consist in showing how Being, 
precisely because of its sheer immediacy, is not simply immediate but always 
alreadya function of what was (or Essence}.24 The point of Hegel's task here 
is indicated by a phrase that we have already seen: "essence must appear." In 
other words, what immediately appears in the form of Being is always al-
ready just the showing forth of Essence; and conversely, Essence is Essence 
only to the extent that it shows itself in the form of immediate Being. 
Hegel's demonstration of this amounts to a critique of immediacy. 
However, unlike Kant's critique of immediacy, Hegel's critique does not 
depend on a problematic dichotomy between thought and being. Hegel be-
gins with immediate Being, but goes on to show how Being, as immediate, 
critiques itself. But just how does Being's self-contradiction or self-critique 
point beyond immediate Being itself? 
Before answering that question, it bears emphasizing just what the 
overcoming of Being may not be. As we have seen, all mediations within the 
sphere of Being are relative mediations. Accordingly, every determinate Some-
thing within the realm of Being is seen to depend upon, or be conditioned 
by, some determinate Other; but any such determinate Other depends upon 
some further determinate Other, and so on ad infinitum. In the long run, 
the sphere of Being as such yields only an infinite regress of mutually related 
and dependent Determinate Beings. Thought finds itself condemned to a 
perennial and arbitrary interplay of qualitative and quantitative alterations 
which lack any stable substance or truth of their own. In order to overcome 
this bad infinite regress, one cannot appeal to yet another kind of external 
determination, for the mere appeal to another determination as such can 
only perpetuate the infinite regress. The problem can be overcome only 
when one succeeds in articulating a kind of relation which is not a relation 
to an Other at all, but rather a kind of self-relation.25 That is, once the 
sphere of Being has shown itself in its nullity, one must enter a sphere where 
all transition is no transition at all.26 The external and relative determina-
tions of all Somethings and Others must ultimately be grounded in that 
which is not relative. Accordingly, the problem which has characterized the 
whole sphere of Being can be summarized as follows: 
things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There is there-
fore something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to 
another, and merely to advance from qualitative to quantitative, and vice 
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versa: there is a permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first 
instance their Essence. 27 
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The movement from Being to Essence cannot be a movement which is 
imposed from without, but must result instead from the internal inadequacy 
belonging to the sphere of Being itself. But at first glance, it does not seem 
that the emptiness of Being, as we have seen it thus far, can propel Being 
beyond itself into the sphere of Essence. In other words, the emptiness of 
Being at first appears as a perfectly inert and self-contained emptiness that 
does not point beyond itself at all. After all, the equivalence of Being and 
Nothing issued forth in the category of Becoming, and the story of Determi-
nate Being within the "Doctrine of Being" is nothing other than the story 
of this Becoming. A closer look at the source of this Becoming, however, 
will reveal that this Becoming has been one-sided and unstable from its very 
inception. The story of Determinate Being is indeed the story of Becoming, 
but it is the story of Becoming in the (one-sided) form of Being. The equiva-
lence of Being and Nothing was responsible for the genesis of Becoming, or, 
more precisely, of Determinateness per se. But because Being and Nothing, 
as equivalent, were presented in their immediate unity, Becoming received 
further articulation as Determinate Being, and not as Determinate Noth-
ing. This was necessary, because immediate unity must take the form of 
Being: "The more precise meaning which Being and Nothing receive, now 
that they are moments, is to be ascertained from the consideration of Deter-
minate Being as the unity in which they are preserved.',28 
The transition from "Determinateness per se" to "Determinate Be-
ing" was a necessary transition. At that stage, the progression of the Logic 
stood at a threshold. The equivalence of Being and Nothing was too imme-
diate to receive any further qualification or nuance.29 Thus the immediate 
unity of Being and Nothing (in the form of Determinateness) had to take 
on the form of Determinate Being. 30 This one-sidedness has finally revealed 
itself in the bad infinite regress that the entire sphere of Determinate Being 
has become. Being's turning back upon itself may thus be represented as its 
return to that threshold of Determinateness per se, where it made that nec-
essary "decision." In anticipation of what is to follow, one might say that 
Essence is Being's reinstatement of its own Determinateness, yet no longer 
in the form of Being or immediacy, but in its negativity.31 
The move to Essence is a move beyond Being as we have known it thus 
far, but it cannot be a move which is external to Being itself. Essence must 
be the self-sublation of Being. This self-sublation is one which retains Being's 
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determinateness, for Being's return upon itself need not go all the way back 
to the very beginning (i.e. to the empty equivalence of Being and Nothing). 
Instead, the return must extend only to that point where the crucial "deci-
sion" was made, a point at which Determinateness had already been achieved. 
In other words, the determinations which constitute the sphere of Being 
have not been forgotten, and so Being's return into itself (Er-in-nerung) is 
just as much a remembering (Erinnerung).32 
Hegel gives technical formulation to this necessary "decision," in his 
discussion of the threshold of Determinateness per se. According to Hegel, 
Essence characterized as Essential Being plays the role of only the first nega-
tion, the kind of negation which is the Determinateness that makes any 
Being a Determinate Being. Negation as Determinateness in this sense is 
"negation posited as affirmative and is the proposition of Spinoza: ornnis 
determinatio est negatio.,,33 Negation which is determination in this imme-
diate sense, however, is such only in relation to an Other. The negation 
which Essence is must be purged of simple Otherness; this kind of negation 
must be "the absolute negativity of Being.,,34 Since Essence is not the Other 
of Being, it follows that Being cannot be the Other of Essence. The kind of 
Other which stands opposed to all Determinate Somethings is to be out-
lawed in the sphere of Essence. In other words, Being and its determinations 
must be preserved in the sphere of Essence and must be distinguished from 
Essence, but not as the simple Other of Essence. 
3. Schein and Essence 
If the Doctrine of Being has been the story of Becoming, then the 
Doctrine of Essence is the story of becoming intelligible. It must be shown, 
of course, that the story of becoming intelligible is continuous with the 
story of Becoming per se. The first chapter of the Doctrine of Essence (en-
titled "Schein" or "Illusory Being") is an attempt to begin articulating the 
nature of the relation of Being to Essence. Since Essence is the truth of 
Being,35 this relation may likewise be called that of Being to its truth, the 
datum ("the given") to its intelligibility, appearance to reality, explanandum 
to explanans. The Doctrine of Essence thus cannot involve a complete oblit-
eration of the determinations of Being; for no theory can be wholly 
indifferent to the evidence for it. On the other hand, the move into the 
sphere of Essence cannot be simply a matter of adding new determinations 
to those in the sphere of Being; for intelligibility is a function, not of the 
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presence or absence of more or less data, but of the meaning, truth, or 
significance of those data that are already given. 
The first section of the first chapter in the Book of Essence, the sec-
tion entitled "The Essential and the Unessential," presents the relation 
between Being and Essence in its most obvious immediacy. Here Hegel tells 
us that "Essence is subIa ted Being. ,,36 Grasped in its immediacy, Essence 
presents itself as the negation of Being in the same manner that the Other 
is the negation of the Something. Conceived in this way, Essence is not the 
immanent truth of Being. Rather, both Essence and Being are two imme-
diacies, two differently determined beings. 
This distinction between the Essential and the Unessential has once 
again made the basis of discourse the sphere of Determinate Being. Yet 
Determinate Being, inasmuch as it is constituted by Being with negation, is 
an inherently unstable foundation. In fact, it is no foundation at all, for it is 
the source of the bad infinite regressions that have already been encoun-
tered within the sphere of Being. Just as there is nothing to prevent the 
Something from passing over into the Other, so too there is nothing to 
prevent the Essential from passing over into the Unessential. On this basis, 
any distinction between the Essential and the Unessential remains a matter 
of perspective, and so "the same content can therefore be regarded now as 
Essential and again as Unessential.,,37 
This spurious distinction between the Essential and the Unessential 
(Essence and Being) is the common source of both dogmatism and relativ-
ism in metaphysics.38 Because the sphere of Determinate Being remains the 
basis of the discussion here, the distinction between the Essential and the 
Unessential will have to be rooted in some further determination imposed 
from without. The distinction is then not made immanently, but "has its 
origin in a third,"39 and so is external, non-rational, arbitrary, and dog-
matic. Inasmuch as Essence is opposed to Being as the Something is opposed 
to the Other, both Essence and Being remain "equal in value."40 After all, 
the Something and the Other are, according to the Doctrine of Being, "both 
Determinate Beings or Somethings," but "each is equally an Other."41 The 
distinction between Essence and Being therefore remains purely perspec-
tival, relative, and so is no distinction at all. "Such a division does not settle 
what is Essential and what is Unessential."42 For Hegel, both dogmatists 
and relativists consider the relationship of Being to Essence to be that of the 
Something to the Other. Dogmatists privilege one instance of givenness 
over another (the Essential Something over the Unessential Other) because 
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they believe that they possess some external, non-relative perspective by which 
they can justify such a distinction. By contrast, the relativist insists-
correctly, in Hegel's view-that all such attempts at privileging one instance 
of givenness over another fall prey to the general critique of given ness that 
has been displayed thus far.43 All such attempts are based on the appeal to 
some external, "third" Something-a Something that is itself merely given 
or immediate, and thus always relative to some Other. 
But then how is it possible to articulate the true relation of Essence to 
Being? The two must be distinguished, but this distinction cannot bear the 
form of the Something-to-Other relationships that have characterized devel-
opment in the realm of Determinate Being. The true relation of Being to 
Essence is articulated more adequately in the section entitled Schein. In 
this section, we learn why the relation of Being to Essence is different from 
the relation of the Something to the Other; by the same token, we also learn 
why this difference is grounded in the immanent movement of Being itself. 
Being is preserved in the sphere of Essence; but it is preserved only inas-
much as it is negated. This is not the negation of the Something over against 
the Other, but rather a negation which refers to the nullity or emptiness 
which the entire sphere of Being has become of its own accord.44 This nul-
lity or emptiness cannot be indeterminate; for such an indeterminate 
emptiness would refer to the pure Being with which the entire Science of 
Logic began.45 The nullity which is the result of the "Doctrine of Being" 
must preserve the determinations which have been developed in the sphere 
of Determinate Being. That which belongs to the sphere of Essence, but 
preserves the determinations of the sphere of Determinate Being, is at 
first given the name of Schein. Depending on the context, Hegel refers 
to Schein also as sublated Being, negated Determinate Being, or Deter-
minate Nothing. 
In its immediacy, Schein appears simply as Illusory Being. As immedi-
ate, Schein appears simply as the Other of Essence, free-floating, insubstantial, 
and lacking any truth of its own. Schein therefore bears the unique charac-
ter of "immediate, negated Determinate Being."46 Since this is a unique 
type of immediacy, "immediacy which is only by means of its negation," 
Hegel gives it the special name of "reflected immediacy [reflektierte 
Unmitte1barkei~."47 Since Schein is reflected immediacy, that which is only 
in its negation, it depends on an Other for its being; it cannot be self-subsis-
tent. As immediate, Schein is dependent upon some Other, but the true 
character of this Other is yet to be articulated. 
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What is immediate takes on the form of Being, but reflected imme-
diacy is that which is only in its being negated. Reflected immediacy is not 
immediacy in the sense of what is simply "there." Immediacy in this sense 
would belong to the sphere of Being. Reflected immediacy, rather, is the 
immediacy which is known to be immediacy; it is the immediacy which 
is still given, but not accepted in the unquestioning manner of the naive 
realist. It is not the immediacy which "simply is." It is the immediacy which 
is, but is not true. In the sphere of Being, the question of truth was not yet 
explicitly raised, and so it could not be answered. At this stage in the sphere 
of Essence, the question of truth has been raised, but not yet answered. 
Reflected immediacy, therefore, is not the immediacy that simply is, but is 
the immediacy that waS.48 It is the immediacy which may have at one time 
passed for the true, but which can no longer do so. It is the immediacy now 
known for what it is: immediate, not automatically true by virtue of its 
givenness alone, and therefore negated. But nothing more can yet be said of it. 
Reflected immediacy corresponds to the given datum which is now 
known to depend on some Other for its truth. It is the datum which is now 
known to require some explanation, but for which an explanation cannot 
yet be given. This phase in the progress of the Logic has revealed explicitly 
for the first time that being is not only immediate. The question of truth 
has been raised explicitly; intelligibility has become a concern; and more is 
demanded than what is merely immediate. Nevertheless, insight into the 
illusory, or insubstantial, nature of the immediate cannot alone point to 
what is not illusory, or what is substantial. Knowing that knowing is not 
merely a matter of immediacy does not yet tell us what it is. Consequently, 
Schein as reflected immediacy is the phenomenon of the skeptic and the 
appearance of the subjective idealist. 
In its immediacy, Schein is the Illusory Being which is dependent upon 
some Other whose character is yet unknown. It is at this stage in the progress 
of pure thought that the skeptic despairs. For the skeptic, the notion that 
Schein should depend on some Other leads thought only to the consider-
ation of a "know-nat-what" as substrate, and so Schein appears to "lack any 
foundation" whatsoever.49 For this reason, "Skepticism did not permit it-
self to say 'It is.",50 Subjective idealism, for its part, failed to get very far 
beyond the standpoint of skepticism. In its immediacy and therefore as sepa-
rate from Essence, Schein was seen to depend on some Other; for the 
subjective idealist, this Other was to be identified as the knowing subject, 
which was conceived as an externally, indifferently related Determinate 
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Being. For this reason, "Modern idealism did not permit itself to regard 
knowledge as a knowing of the thing-in-itself.,,51 
Both skepticism and idealism do admit, however, that-in spite of its 
illusory nature-Schein embraces within itself a multitude of determinations 
which, in fact, constitutes "the entire manifold wealth of the world.,,52 The 
skeptic, in denying the reality of any substantial foundation to Schein, 
cannot explain the fact of such a manifoldly determined immediacy. The 
subjective idealist, on the other hand, identifies the subject as the source of 
such determinatenesses. At first glance, it may appear that the subjective 
idealist has advanced well beyond the skeptic, but Hegel argues that this is 
not so. Phenomenologically, Schein as a manifoldly determined immediacy 
might be identified with the given contents of one's consciousness. In at-
tempting to explain the genesis of such manifoldly determined conscious 
contents, the subjective idealist has merely cited as their source some fea-
ture of consciousness itself. But this does not help at all. If the subjective 
idealist should appeal to any specific psychological or cognitive determina-
tions of subjectivity in order to account for the variety of conscious contents, 
then these so-called "subjective" determinations themselves would also have 
to be relegated to the realm of mere Schein. The very idea that the determi-
nations of subjectivity can account for the illusory contents of consciousness 
is itself just another conscious content. For this reason, Kant is forced to 
argue (implicitly, if not explicitly) that one can know, prior to knowing, the 
subjective determinations that allegedly account for the determinate con-
tents of consciousness. 
Schein, grasped in its immediacy, is non-self-subsistent and therefore 
has its being in an Other. Subjective idealists have identified this Other as 
the determinate, cognitive apparatus of the finite subject. The problem with 
all such subjective idealists, however, is that they implicitly conceive of the 
relation between thought and being, or knowing and known, in the same 
way that they conceive of the relation between one Determinate Being and 
another. The representations of the Leibnizian monad, for example, "are 
indifferent and immediate over against one another and the same in rela-
tion to the monad itself.,,53 The Appearance of Kantian idealism likewise 
"presupposes affections, determinations of the subject, which are immedi-
ate relatively to themselves and to the subject.,,54 In a similar fashion, Fichte's 
Anstoss, though a determinateness in the ego, 
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is at the same time immediate, a limitation of the ego, which it [the ego] 
can transcend, but which has in it an element of indifference, so that 
although the limitation is in the ego, it contains an immediate non-being 
of the ego. 55 
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The subject and its object, or consciousness and its conscious content, 
are therefore related to one another as two finite beings, as the Something 
to the Other. The infinite, consciousness, is thereby finitized, and we are 
left with another version of the bad infinite. In the case of Kant, any alleged 
determination of the "really real" subject must remain just another Appear-
ance. In the case of Fichte, the ego can never understand the nature of the 
non-ego; as a result, the ego is forever condemned to limitation, to an in-
surmountable Ought. More generally speaking, such subjective idealisms 
cannot explain how consciousness is the infinite which can accommo-
date any conscious content whatsoever, but which is itself not just another 
conscious content. 
Both skepticism and subjective idealism take as their theoretical basis 
Schein as it is grasped only in its simple immediacy. The Schein of the skep-
tic and of the subjective idealist is "immediate, negated Determinate Being." 
But as such, Schein is an inherently contradictory category; for immediacy 
takes the form of Being, and we are speaking here of an immediate nega-
tion. By the same token, the claims of the skeptic and subjective idealist are 
implicitly contradictory. Both positions present themselves as critiques of 
immediacy, and yet they must also accept as their own starting point the 
given fact that Schein has for its content a manifold wealth of differently 
determined illusory beings.56 
As implicitly self-contradictory, both skepticism and subjective ideal-
ism contain within themselves the grounds of their own reversal. Because 
both the skeptic and subjective idealist apprehend Schein only in its imme-
diacy, as the Other of Essence, neither can grasp the basic truth which lies 
hidden in the notion of Schein as "immediate, negated Determinate Be-
ing." As we shall see, the nature of the solution is implicit in the problem. 
In effect, both skepticism and subjective idealism take their questions from 
the sphere of Essence, but both seek answers still in the realm of Being. An 
adequate solution will consist in seeing how immediacy and negation, Be-
ing and Essence, are not indifferently related at all but rather identical in 
their difference. 
Inasmuch as Schein is apprehended in its immediacy, answers are still 
being sought in the sphere of Being. Nevertheless, the discussion is already 
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taking place within the realm of Essence, and Hegel says that there can be 
no need of demonstrating this fact. 57 For inasmuch as the immediate has 
been shown to be inadequate, and the question of truth has been raised 
explicitly, the foundation of the discourse has already become that of Es-
sence. Being has shown itself to be a nullity (Illusory Being), and the 
articulation of this fact means that the sphere of Being has already (mini-
mally) transcended itself. Schein, precisely as a nullity and thus as that which 
is distinct from Essence, "sublates itself and withdraws into Essence."58 Even 
if the immediate has been shown to be untrue, it must be presupposed that 
at least something is true. The exact nature of this truth, of this "withdrawal 
into Essence," has eluded both the skeptic and the subjective idealist. At 
this stage in the discourse, the precise nature of such truth becomes the 
next topic for further explication. In Hegel's words, it must now be shown 
that "the determinations which distinguish it [Schein] from Essence are de-
terminations of Essence itself."59 
4. Schein Becoming Essence 
The course of the discussion thus far has indicated, at least implicitly, 
that Schein contains within itself two moments. First, as independent of 
Essence, Schein contains the moment of negated Determinate Being. This 
is the "nothingness which yet is," the nothingness to whose realm the skep-
tic relegates all experience and thought.60 Secondly, Schein includes a 
moment of immediacy, but since this is a special type of immediacy-imme-
diacy which is only by means of its negation-it is given the special name of 
"reflected immediacy." Such immediacy imparts to Schein a type of Being, 
but "Being as a moment."61 It is the combination of these two moments 
that explains the parado~ical character of Schein.62 Schein is the Being which 
in Essence is non-Being. Schein corresponds to the given, the datum which 
is "there" (immediate, Being), but which is untrue or illusory (negated, Noth-
ing). In spite of the fact that Schein is illusory, untrue, and negated, it must 
also be in some sense if it is to appear as Schein at all. The raw datum, 
although it cannot be accepted as true, still cann.ot be ignored; it is undeni-
ably "there." Hence, one must take account of Schein's moment of Being 
just as much as its moment of negation. 
To treat a single moment of any category as if it were the whole is to 
fail to grasp the category in its truth. Yet even if both moments in a category 
are given equal attention, there is still no guarantee that the category will be 
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seen in its truth. One may acknowledge both moments of a category, yet fail 
to see them in their necessary unity. It is just such an apparent disconnect-
edness between two moments which allows one moment to take precedence 
over another. Thus when Schein is presented only in its immediacy, its two 
moments of negated Determinate Being and reflected immediacy seem to 
be stuck together forcibly, indifferently, and non-rationally. For the two are, 
by nature, contradictory. The origin of Schein's two moments is clear enough: 
when grasped in its (1) immediacy, Schein appears as the Other of Essence, 
and as the Other of Essence, Schein retains a moment of (2) negated Deter-
minate Being. Each of these two moments represents, respectively, what 
appears to be a moment of Being and a moment of Nothing. It is not yet 
clear how these two can be united in the same category. Of course, here one 
cannot simply appeal to the primordial unity of pure Being and pure Noth-
ing; for the moments now in question do not represent Being and Nothing 
in their original purity. 
As noted briefly before, the category of Schein, insofar as it is grasped 
in its immediacy, will inevitably remain contradictory, incomplete, untrue, 
unstable, and one-sided. Yet this one-sidedness is not merely the result of 
the failure to see that Schein has two moments; even Schein in its one-sided 
immediacy manifests two moments. Rather, the one-sidedness of Schein as 
it now stands resides in the apparent opposition of the two moments to one 
another. At this stage, it is not yet clear how, or even whether, these two 
moments are intrinsically united. Schein, when still present in its imme-
diacy, marks the stage at which one may understand that the data are 
somehow "there," but not true; but one is still not able to say how or why 
this can be so. The answer to this question will be found in the demonstra-
tion of how the two moments of Schein are necessarily united. Yet to 
understand the two moments as united is to comprehend Schein as it is no 
longer immediate; and to comprehend Schein in this way is to comprehend 
that it is no longer the Other of Essence; but this, finally, is the same thing 
as seeing Schein as it passes over into Essence. In short, to resolve the 
inner contradiction in Schein is to demonstrate how and why Schein is 
really Essence. 
Closer consideration of the two moments of Schein will reveal that 
they are not indifferent to one another. The first moment of Schein is ne-
gated Determinate Being. Since every determination is a negation, negated 
Determinate Being is really a negation of a negation. But negation of nega-
tion is self-negation, or self-relation of a purely negative sort.63 And 
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self-relation bears the form of immediacy, even if it is a purely negative type 
of self-relation. The reflected immediacy of Schein-i.e. the immediacy which 
is only by means of its negation-is therefore the type of negative self-
relation already implicit in the moment of negated Determinate Being. The 
two moments of Schein, when understood in their truth, are seen to be 
necessarily united. The explanation of how Schein is "there," but not true 
on its own, is thus beginning to fall into place. Since immediacy represents 
Being and negation Nothing, Being and Nothing reach a stable, more highly 
mediated unity in Schein as it is thus understood. 
In its immediacy, Schein appeared as the Other of Essence; it appeared 
to have its "Determinate Being only in relation to another, only in its ne-
gated Determinate Being.,,64 For this reason, Schein was seen as a mere 
non-self-subsistent, inexplicable Appearance. It still appeared in the "deter-
minateness of Being," and its reflected immediacy bore the strange character 
of an immediacy which had been, i.e. an immediacy that is only in its nega-
tion, in its relation to an Other. At the time, the character of this Other was 
still unknown. Closer consideration has shown that the negation in Schein 
must be a type of self-negation. All negation by, or relation to, an Other has 
thus been banished from the sphere ofEssence.lllusory Being thus becomes 
intelligible Being on its own, without the help of any external Other. ThiS, 
of course, is the very possibility that the skeptic and the subjective idealist 
had denied; for the Other which these two sought was not the absolute 
Other-in-self characteristic of the sphere of Essence, but rather the Other 
imported from the realm of Being-the relative Other "out there." 
Schein becomes intelligible on its own, through its own self-negation. 
Schein thus becomes self-subsistent, absolute negativity. But Schein, charac-
terized in this way, is not Schein, but Essence. In other words, Schein is 
Essence, but Essence as it is grasped in its most immediate, unarticulated 
form. "Schein is Essence itself in the determinateness of Being. ,,65 For Es-
sence is absolute negativity, pure negative self-relation. But this negativity, 
as self-relation, is also immediacy. The two moments of Schein-"implicit 
negativity" and "reflected immediacy"-are therefore identical to the two 
moments of Essence.66 Schein is thus immediacy which has as a moment 
negated Determinate Being; it is the Being which is non-Being, the datum 
which is there but not true. Essence is the absolute negativitywhich has as a 
moment immediacy; it is the non-Being which is Being, the negativity which, 
as self-related, must take on the form of Being. As the Other of Essence, 
Schein has become-or is always already becoming-Essence itself.67 
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It follows from this that Essence is the "unity of absolute negativity 
and immediacy.,,68 For one moment of Essence is absolute negativity, abso-
lute negative self-relation. The other moment is immediacy, the reflected 
immediacy which is nothing other than Essence's self-relation, or self-equal-
ity. Only the necessary combination of these two moments can explain how 
Schein is immediate, "there," and apparently underived, but at the same 
time determinate, negated, and therefore derived. For the immediacy of 
Essence is not just any immediacy, but reflected immediacy, the immediacy 
which is only as the result of some "prior" activity.69 This "prior" activity is 
the absolute negativity of Essence, which, since it is a type of self-relation, 
issues forth in the form of immediacy, or Being. Thus, the immediacy of 
Schein (as Illusory Being) is a derived, determined immediacy. The negativ-
ity of Essence is "negative self-relation, a negating that is a repelling of itself, 
and the intrinsic immediacy is thus negative or determinate in regard to 
it.,,70 Since the immediacy of Essence is a reflected immediacy, Essence pre-
serves within itself the determinations of Being, but without their basis in 
Being itself. For the basis of the determined immediacy is no longer Being, 
but absolute negativity: 
The immediacy of the determinateness in Schein over against Essence is 
consequently nothing other than Essence's own immediacy; but the im-
mediacy is not simply affirmative, but is the purely mediated or reflected 
immediacy that is Schein-Being not as Being, but only as the determi· 
nateness of Being as opposed to mediation; Being as a moment. 71 
Essence preserves within itself the determinations of Being, but these 
determinations have not yet been made explicit in the realm of Essence: 
Absolute Essence in this simple equality with itself has no Determinate 
Being; but it must develop Determinate Being, for it is both in itself and 
for itself, i.e., it differentiates the determinations which are implicit within 
it.72 
These implicit determinations become explicit only in the later chapters of 
the Doctrine of Essence. 
As negative self.relation, Essence appears as the infinite, self-subsis-
tent basis of all forms of non-self-subsistent, determined Schein. But one 
should not be mislead into thinking that Schein is a merely residual, nones-
sential expression of Essence. Essence shows itself through Schein because 
it must. As Hegel writes, "Essence must appear.,,73 Essence and Schein "need" 
each other, and, in fact, are each other; the two moments of absolute negativity 
158 The Owl ofMineZV8 29:2 (Spring 1998) 
and reflected immediacy are necessarily united. Since absolute negativity is 
negative self,relation, it is impossible to have absolute negativity (Essence) 
without some form of immediacy or Being (Schein); and conversely, it is 
impossible to have Being or immediacy without negative self-relation. With 
this, Hegel has demonstrated his two fundamental claims: 
(1) The Schein that emerges from the sphere of Being only seems to be 
"mere" Schein, but is in fact always the Schein of what is essential, the 
Schein of Essence itself. To speak of Schein as the indifferent or inessential 
expression of an underlying, essential substrate would be to plunge the dis-
cussion once again into the realm of Determinate Being and into the bad 
infinite that inevitably results therein. Thus "Schein in Essence is not the 
Schein of an Other, but is Schein per se, the Schein of Essence itself."74 
(2) Essence, in order to be Essence at all, must seem and only ever does 
seem as Illusory Being. There is no thing-in-itself beyond the seeming. Ac-
cording to Hegel, Kant was right to argue that Schein, or illusion, is necessary; 
however, Kant was wrong to think that such illusion is relative to the finite 
subject alone, rather than a function of Essence itself. 75 
5. Conclusion 
The identity-in-difference of Schein and Essence, of immediacy and 
self-relation, implies that all determinate immediacy, as given, is equally a 
function of the negative self-relation known as Essence. In the final part of 
his Science of Logic, in the "Subjective Logic," Hegel goes on to show that 
the negative self-relation that constitutes Essence must ultimately be com-
prehended in terms of subjectivity, or the unity of self-consciousness. 76 
Now without delving further into the subjective logic, it is possible 
briefly to summarize the lesson contained in the transition from Being to 
Essence (that "Essence must appear") as it speaks to both Kant and the old 
metaphysicians. 
The common failing of Kant and the old metaphysicians was their 
inability to comprehend the identity-in-difference of Schein and Essence, 
immediacy and negative self-relation (or subjectivity). The old metaphysi-
cians regarded Seeming and Essence as two ready-made, given kinds of be-
ing, indifferently and externally related to one another, and indifferently 
and externally related to thought as well. The alleged indifference and exter-
nality between thought and being ultimately undermined the old metaphy-
sicians' claim to know that being and thought are, in fact, commensurable 
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with one another. Kant was right to criticize the old metaphysicians and to 
problematize the relation of being to thought. He correctly concluded that 
the universality of thought could be defended (e.g. against the Humean 
skeptic) only if it could be shown that the knowing and what is known are 
not externally or indifferently related to one another. Along these lines, 
Kant's transcendental deduction aims to show that the conditions of the 
possibility of experience are at the same time the conditions of the possibility 
of the objects of experience; 77 in other words, the knowing and what is 
known are not externally or indifferently related to one another. However, 
because of his subjectivistic starting point, Kant was forced to conclude that 
what is known-although intrinsically related to the knowing-is not being 
in itself. 
For Hegel, the proper solution beyond these dual failings is to start-
like the old metaphysicians-with being itself (and thus to refrain from 
presupposing any necessary dichotomy between being and thought), but to 
show how being is incomplete on its own terms, and calls for negative self· 
relation (subjectivity) in order to be itself. 78 
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